Media regulation

Freedom of expression and government reform

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The May issue of Yanhuang Chunqiu contains an essay by Zi Zhongyun (资中筠) on freedom of expression and institutional reform. Zi is a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and is the former editor of American Studies Quarterly.

Her references to the relatively open media in the south (read, Southern Metropolis Daily and its stable of newspapers and magazines) are particularly relevant following the recent controversy over Southern Metropolis Weekly editor Chang Ping.

Realizing the Right of Expression Requires Institutional Guarantees

by Zi Zhongyun / YC

I don't have much interest now in studying certain formulations in leaders' reports. I have only one attitude: look at how they are put into practice. Sometimes, some statements are not workable. I remember a few years ago, a newspaper organized a symposium, around the time that "scientific concept of development" and "people-centered" had just appeared. I spoke at the symposium and wrote up an article based on that speech, arguing that "people-centered" had to include human rights. And I said that good slogans and good formulations had to rely on the healthy power of society to be put into practice. When the healthy power of society is suppressed, even the best slogans cannot be carried out. Later, I was unable to publish this paper anywhere. Someone said that leaders' fine words were "promises" made to the people. I feel that the statements made in their speeches aren't promises that are made good simply by saying them. For example, they say they'll give the people the right of expression, but in practice, the right of expression is controlled as it always has been. To this day I have not found earnest action taken to allow and support the the right of expression. Even the most open newspapers in the south are frequently given yellow cards. Whether or not there is free speech is a touchstone; there's no point to further discussion of democracy. We talked about democracy in the past, but it's never been carried out.

To carry out freedom of speech and the right of expression, private-sector newspapers and periodicals must be permitted. They say you can criticize "according to the law," but this "law" rests in the hands of the leaders. A few newspapers in the south are market-driven and no longer live off the state, but the higher-ups can still replace editors and publishers. And the publishing houses: they don't need to openly say that you can't publish this or that book. They just give you fewer book numbers and you can't handle it. There are lots of techniques for limiting the right of expression, so there's fundamentally no need to openly announce that freedom of speech is being suppressed, or that you aren't being permitted to say something. Call up the editor or publisher, make an anonymous phone call—no one will dare to disobey. If you really disobey, there goes your job. The editor himself may not care, but his underlings will lose their jobs too. To date there has been no posture of relaxing controls on speech; it's just that the methods have changed.

I feel that the question of freedom of speech does not only rest with the Publicity Department. The head of the Publicity Department must obey the Central Committee. If the head of the Publicity Department is not in line with the Central Committee, then they change people. We feel pressure from the Publicity Department directly, but in fact it's a question of overall policy. We must analyze lots of statements, a great deal of things in the government work report and the 17th Party Congress report, and decide what's going to be put into practice, what's meant for the ears of foreigners, or what's meant to assuage public opinion. I find that these are very hard to differentiate.

In addition, there's one more thing about which I'm not very optimistic; that is, when outstanding individuals are influenced by interests and no longer uphold their old ideas. Recently I ran into a few academics who had good ideas at one time, but once they entered the CPPCC and the NPC or attained a certain position, they felt they had the opportunity to gain information, and said that things were quite free and democratic now. It's impossible for them to abandon those interests. If their speech is not in line with the mainstream, then take away a few of their classes, suspend them from teaching for a year. Without classes, or if those conferences no longer invite them, they won't be able to bear it. Their income will drop a sizeable amount, as will their social standing. Of course, there are some people who will disregard anything to uphold the truth. But those who aren't shaken by poverty are in the minority.

As for whether we've improved, if we do a vertical comparison then of course things are much better than before the reform and opening up. But those expectations are a little low; we ought to do a horizontal comparison now. It's the 21st Century, and things around us have made great progress. Chinese people have studied the American general elections quite carefully. But we are confused about the changing sessions of 17th Party Congress and the NPC, which ought to be our "general elections," and as for the leaders who are elected to the seats they are marked down for, how much of a right to know and right to be heard do we have toward them? We can only guess at things through the rumor mill. The countries around us in southeast Asia, including Vietnam, are already out in front. Korea was originally an autocracy, but they've crossed that barrier. Russia, regardless of its many problems, or whether people are saying Putin is pulling back rights, they can't return to the past; they've already crossed that barrier. Our democracy hasn't yet crossed that barrier. It's hard to push forward now. Even if a truly great leader wanted to push forward, it would still be difficult, because so many people with vested interests are blocking it, and there are obstacles both horizontal and vertical at the lower levels. I think the only thing to do is open up public opinion and let that healthy power express itself. And there might be further sacrifices, like in the Sun Zhigang affair: when the Southern Metropolis Daily exposed the Sun Zhigang affair, one person lost his job and another went to prison. And that was relatively stable. If we cannot open up supervision by public opinion in a timely fashion, who knows what will happen next.

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There are currently 25 Comments for Freedom of expression and government reform.

Comments on Freedom of expression and government reform

Yanhuang Chunqiu is the best mainland magazine bar none at the moment for my money (and only CNY5.80 of my money, come to that). I really should subscribe because the Sanlian bookstore sells out its batch in no time.

Why is it that the women in this country always seem to have more sack than the men? I applaud the courage but fear that Yanhuang Chunqiu may pass quickly into its 秋 phase with the publication of this piece.

she's right.

the freedom of expression is the best guarantee against government tyranny.

and "institutional guarantees"--such as an independent judiciary and a court system open and accessible to the public--are the best guarantee of the freedom of expression.

of course, the government in China is not entirely filled with fools, and may in fact be no more filled with fools than the governments of its sister states.

officials from top to bottom recognize the necessity of institutional reforms. the problem here is a lack of consensus as to... ... ... [wait for it, because it's a deceptively simple point] ... ... ...

... the problem here is a lack of consensus as to the breadth and depth of the freedom of expression.

that is, the problem here is simply the refusal by government to recognize citizens' rights to just-plain-ol' say what they want to say.

this right, in the abstract, is attractive. and it's attractive as well in specific circumstances--namely, where the freedom of expression strengthens the government's position against its opponents (e.g., against foreign governments or against corrupt domestic officials).

the "freedom expression of the government's position by the people" is attractive; the freedom of expression in its real and immediate sense, much less so.

the freedom of expression is a "threat" to all authority, government and otherwise, where the "threat" is defined as a less-than-perfect consensus concerning each and every exercise of that authority. having suppressed the freedom of expression--or rather, having failed to recognize it--for time immemorial, China's been riding the proverbial tiger. and truth be told, it takes guts to get off, to plant one's feet firmly on the ground, and to face the problem eye-to-eye.

"institutional guarantees" of the freedom of expression are essential to preserve the right once born; but the right is still inconceivable as yet in the minds of those who matter, the public as well as the government.

I have said long ago when the Chinese GDP per capita surpasses 5000USD. China will be a democracy without any doubt. Now the imperail threat is still there and we can not afford this democratic system and its proven track record such as social unrest and foreign manipulation untill Chinese overal economy and military has a dorminance over USA, the biggest threat to the world and especailly manipulator of democracy and human rights.

@Kaiser,

Let's see if this time things are carried out differently.

Ultimately, being co-opted into silence is worse than the worst form of material poverty. But I doubt those public intellectuals and politicians Prof. Zi mentioned share this view.

I admire Prof. Zi and the editors of Yanhuang Chunqiu for their courage to defend the importance of "supervision by public opinion."

History shows again and again that keeping the public in ignorance about hidden agendas of those in power is harder than the authorities and their collaborators envisioned.

@Lark in Cloud: I fear you're a hopeless optimist ;-)

I don't think Yanhuang Chunqiu is under any threat - it and journals like it make tidy work units for troublesome intellectuals, and provide outlets for harmless old cadres and retired academics to publish their meandering essays on free speech, party reform, and unconventional experiments in road building in some small village in 1963. And the authorities are able to point to these journals and say "look, we have open dialogue" (though no one else can point to these journals and say, "look, we have open dialogue"). It's win-win for them.

Online copies of journal articles used to have a lag of several months behind the print version, but Gao Shijie recently began posting annotated editions of the latest articles to her blog. Interesting stuff (some of it, at least).

Where can you get hold of this Yanhuang Chunqiu? I've been looking all over Beijing. What's the address of the bookstore mentioned above?

CCP wants a step by step politic reform, in which, if democracy is the final result, CCP still has some advantage in politic life. This purpose is not evil. Every politic parties in democratic country want to have politic advantage, to fulfill their goal, good for public or good for some group.

In history, in 1945, after Japan's surrender, CCP was eager to build a democratic China, in which, CCP would have politic advantage because CCP represented the immense lower class and educated elites (and at the time, CCP is really democratic). But Guomindang (Kuomintang, KMT), backed by democratic U.S, refused and launched civil war and defeated. Then there is no challenging party left.

In this case, we can see, how ideological preference, but not good for people, kills democracy, in the democracy's name.

89 is a good timing for politic reform. The atmosphere in society and inside CCP is supportive for politic reform. But too drastic students and western opportunist cornered CCP and hawkish group in CCP got the control.

In this case, I have a feeling that in general western at the time needed a crippled China more than democratic China, or say, they needed an ideological capitalism friendly China government more than Chinese freedom and happiness. Hey, I know normal western people are usually of goodwill, but at the politic high profile, it's just not the case. Saudi Arabia, is an example.

2008 is a good timing and bad timing. Good is, the CCP sees the politic atmosphere is favorable, and is willing to reform at this time; bad is, the economic challenge or say severe economic crisis imposed by western economic crocodile.

Economically, undercurrent is running mountains high. China's wealth accumulated during 10 years, can be forayed overnight. At this time, direct control on everything is a must for defending. The politic reform will weaken the ability to defending. Of course, non-democracy may lead to bad economic decision.

It reminds me of an old gentlman back in 1987,whose name is Qian Jiaju.
There will come the day when democracy comes to China.

André -- I was talking about the 三联书店; website: http://www.sdxjpc.com/about.shtml it's just north of the Academy of Fine Arts, up from Wangfujing.
Yanhuang Chunqiu can also be read online for a small fee per article at qikan.com, and here's their page with subscription details:
http://cn.qikan.com/JournalDetails.aspx?issn=1003-1170
They do bound annual editions which I'm thinking of calling up to get for the past two years. I like the rambly historical reminiscences Joel mentions.
Prof. Zi's article was one of a group of pieces on freedom of speech published under the same title in the latest edition. I read a couple of the others last night; all heartening, trenchant stuff from retired senior cadre. I very much take Joel's point about how influential it may actually all be, but nonetheless console myself by assuming they speak for a sizeable constituency in high office. More power to them.

@Lark In The Cloud - The thing that amazes me is you believe the west has so much influence in Chinese politics, when - and listen carefully - it has absolutely no influence what so ever. Full stop. No influence at all.

It had almost none under the KMT (Chiang just took the money the US gave him to fight the Japanese and the communists and spread it around his cronies). It has absolutely none now.

As for the Communist ever having been democratic - please don't tell me that you actually believe this. Who elected Mao? Hua? Deng? Jiang? Hu? There will never be democracy under communism - the two are mutually exclusive, as the history of Eastern Europe has shown us. As for the Communist party trying to fix things so it always remains in power and never need listen to the will of the people - that to me is an evil as great as that being commited by Robert Mugabe right now. Hopefully the people of Zimbabwe will bring an end to the ridiculous spectacle of an 80-year-old dictator clinging to power by attempting to deny the people their choice within the next month, but when will the Chinese party be given the chance to rid China of its corrupt dictators?

@FOARP,

I think the discussion can't be continued when you use "none", "no at all" and "ever" to ignore the facts.

Good day.

@Lark in the Clouds: Well, it's written like that to elicit a response - the response I'm looking for being any proof whatsoever of Chinese politics being significantly influenced from the outside post Soviet/Chinese-split, any proof that the events in '89 were caused even partly by 'western opportunists', or any proof whatsoever that the CCP was eager to build a democratic China. You see, I enjoy debating things like this, and from the way you argue I can see that you are not an ideologue, but I think you're basing your arguments on a very weak foundation - but if you have evidence to the contrary from independent sources I would love to see it.

@FOARP

It's amusing that you insist that you used words such as "none" "to elicit a response", request for proof.

"it has absolutely no influence what so ever. Full stop. No influence at all."
"It had almost none under..."
"It has absolutely none now".
"Who elected Mao? Hua? Deng? Jiang? Hu? There will never be democracy under communism - the two are mutually exclusive, as the history of Eastern Europe has shown us"

However, did you provide any proof to support your such strong opinion? Amazingly no.

Bye.

@Lark in the Clouds - To show abscence requires no proof except the abscence of proof to the contrary. If you cannot prove your assertions then why make them?

The historical record shows that Roosevelt and Truman had almost no influence on Chiang's behaviour - that Chiang refused to take advice from General Stillwell or Wedemayer, large sums of money were granted to the Nanjing government with virtually no strings attached and no real checking as to what was done with the money. I know that the communists call Chiang's regime 'semi-colonial' but they have never shown any real proof to substantiate that claim. If you wish to claim that the KMT was motivated by foreign ideology - I would say that this is quite dubious given its roots in the Leninism and the theories of Sun Yatsen and others.


You made the assertion that the CCP was a genuinely pro-democracy party after world war II, I would make the assertion that as no elections were ever held in Yan'an, as no elections were held in any of the other base areas, and as no elections were held after the victory in the civil war there is a strong presumption that they were and are still an undemocratic party. Where is the evidence of pro-democratic sentiment to back up your statement?

Nor has any evidence ever been offered to show that the student protesters in 1989 were manipulated or incited by western forces. Once again, the CCP makes the assertion as though it were true without ever showing evidence to back it up, and you are now repeating their version of it.


@FOARP

"If you wish to claim that the KMT was motivated by foreign ideology - I would say that this is quite dubious given its roots in the Leninism and the theories of Sun Yatsen and others."

Where I did say that KMT was motivated by foreign ideology?

"The historical record shows that Roosevelt and Truman had almost no influence on Chiang's behaviour - that Chiang refused to take advice from General Stillwell or Wedemayer, large sums of money were granted to the Nanjing government with virtually no strings attached and no real checking as to what was done with the money."

Do you EVER have logic? Why not gave CCP these money if there were no pre-conditions? Why on earth gave Nanjing goverment money without strings attached and no real checking?

U.S chose KMT as agent in China because of ideology, NOT because of Chinese happiness and democracy. If U.S government did care about democracy, it should not put money and WEAPONS into the China civil war, it should not send military adviser to support Chiang, it should help to materialize Double-Tenth Agreement.

This choice was out of "communist is evil and enemy" ideology and U.S interests, not "KMT is democratic", and not "the result is democracy".

In international affairs, for U.S, democracy and human right is more important only when convenient. There are too many examples, such as Pinochet Ugarte, Saudi Arabia, recent Egypt, Isreal, you name it.

This pragmatism and hypocrisy help to destroy democracy, not promote democracy.

@FOARP

"You made the assertion that the CCP was a genuinely pro-democracy party after world war II, I would make the assertion that as no elections were ever held in Yan'an, as no elections were held in any of the other base areas, and as no elections were held after the victory in the civil war there is a strong presumption that they were and are still an undemocratic party. Where is the evidence of pro-democratic sentiment to back up your statement?"

Did you ever learn something about Double-Tenth Agreement and its background?

"Nor has any evidence ever been offered to show that the student protesters in 1989 were manipulated or incited by western forces. Once again, the CCP makes the assertion as though it were true without ever showing evidence to back it up, and you are now repeating their version of it."

When Zhao, who was in favor of politic reform, promised to students to push forward reform. But the student protester leaders, insisted on immediate action (which is naive and impossible). This cornered the party. The hard-liners in the party took over power and tragedy happened later.

Why student protester leaders insisted? When they are adviced that stundents leave TAM, they encourage student to stay. At the very day, the troops will enter the TAM, the students were left there, and the student leaders run away (using the conduit provided by foreigners)

link
link

Why student protester leaders insisted? When they are adviced that stundents leave TAM, they encourage student to stay. At the very day, the troops will enter the TAM, the students were left there, and the student leaders run away (using the conduit provided by foreigners)

I would guess that the reason was that student leaders tend to be both stubborn and self serving, hence their refusal to leave and their quick escape. I think a foreign conspiracy makes your argument look more than a little silly. as to why foreign bodies helped many escape China, again I would guess this was more to do with the general outrage that many outside of China felt aboout the TS events and less to do with your "foreign conduit"

@mike,

Sorry, I didn't make it clear because I write it up in a hurry.

I don't think it's "foreign conspiracy" myself, either.

My point is that the student leaders, in such a condition, with the world watching it, got the wrong idea that they were able to do much more. They wanted to use the foreign attention, and thought "you will not do that!". But this is rather stupid. Such stance made reformists weaker and made hard-liner stronger. Then the "western opportunist" I referred to, gave them illusion that they (student leaders) could do that.

"Why on earth gave Nanjing goverment money without strings attached and no real checking?"

Why indeed? This was a question many at the time asked and others asked later. During the anti-Japanese war it was argued by people like Cabot-Lodge that without support Chiang's government would collapse - but others (Stillwell for example) argued that it might be better to support the communists. After the war some felt that Chiang's government should be supported as a bulwark against communism - but this did not result in any great level of control over that government. There is in fact no evidence of anything but the most superficial influence over Chiang's government (pre-evacuation that is). Can you offer any?

"Did you ever learn something about Double-Tenth Agreement and its background?"

I have been to the museum documenting the double-tenth agreement in Nanjing, but asides from making sweeping statements about the Chinese communist party's commitment to 'real democracy' I saw no evidence at all that the CCP supported democratic elections. It seemed to me that they were using the word 'democratic' in the same way that it is used in the name of the DPRK or DDR, and not in any meaningful sense. The record shows that fighting continued during the talks and that no concrete proposals were arrived at - in fact there appears to have been a high degree of cynicism on both sides. It is from this viewpoint that I say that I see no evidence of pro-democratic sentiment in the CCP either then or now.

"My point is that the student leaders, in such a condition, with the world watching it, got the wrong idea that they were able to do much more. They wanted to use the foreign attention, and thought "you will not do that!" . . . Then the "western opportunist" I referred to, gave them illusion that they (student leaders) could do that."

The students in '89 may have believed that the CCP would not order their massacre in front of the eyes of the world, that the CCP leadership did so says much about their character, but nothing about the students. As for 'western opportunists', if you are refering to people in the west who hoped for their success, then you are talking about the vast majority of people in the west who knew anything about those protests. However, there is no evidence whatsoever of the students receiving outside assistance before or during the protests - if they counted on world opinion then they were mistaken, that is all.

"In international affairs, for U.S, democracy and human right is more important only when convenient. There are too many examples, such as Pinochet Ugarte, Saudi Arabia, recent Egypt, Isreal, you name it.

This pragmatism and hypocrisy help to destroy democracy, not promote democracy."

I totally agree, but it should also be noted that it was in the spirit of 'pragmatism' that Nixon made his famous visit to China, starting the sequence of events which ended with the re-establishing of relations between the US and China (although it should be noted that China enjoyed relations with Britain and France for a number of years before that). Do you think that opening to the west on this 'pragmatic' basis has helped to promote democracy in China or discourage it?

"After the war some felt that Chiang's government should be supported as a bulwark against communism - but this did not result in any great level of control over that government. There is in fact no evidence of anything but the most superficial influence over Chiang's government (pre-evacuation that is). Can you offer any?"

Without monetary and military supports from U.S, Chiang could not afford the third China civil war. Isn't this the most substantial influence? Then what can be called influence? What is your logic here?

"I have been to the museum documenting the double-tenth agreement in Nanjing, but asides from making sweeping statements about the Chinese communist party's commitment to 'real democracy' I saw no evidence at all that the CCP supported democratic elections."

You are playing logic trick here: egg and hen.

You should know that CCP at the time was treated as illegal party (共匪). Without being treated as legal party, how could CCP be elected? BTW, can I ask you notice the fact: Chinese people, at the time, by following and supporting "illegal" CCP, in effect chose CCP; CCP, by inner election, decided its party leaders. This was not formal election, but it was some style of election. The other main candidate, KMT, being "legal" by status quo and by force, was put away by Chinese people.

The Double-Tenth Agreement, however, stated mutual regonition (Section 1,5):
1. CCP got legal position;
2. CCP recognized Chiang as legal leader of ROC;

Aside that, for election, there were four sections (2,3 and 8,10)
1. CPPCC
2. National Assembly
(section 2 and 3)
3. local autonomy
4. election mode, including general election
(section 8 and 9)

Have you really read the Double-Tenth Agreement?


-------
Here is the Chinese version of Double-Tenth Agreement

政府与中共代表会谈纪要

(双十协定)

(一九四五年十月十日)

中国国民政府蒋主席于抗战胜利后,邀请中国共产党中央委员会主席毛泽东先生,商讨国家大计。毛先生于八月二十八日应邀来渝,进见蒋主席,曾作多次会谈;同时双方各派出代表,政府方面为王世杰、张群、张治中、邵力子四先生,中共方面为周恩来、王若飞两先生,迭在友好和谐的空气中,进行商谈,已获得左列之结果,并仍将在互信互让之基础上,继续商谈,求得圆满之解决。兹特发表会谈纪要如下:

一、关于和平建国的基本方针,一致认为:中国抗日战争业已结束,和平建国的新阶段,即将开始,必须共同努力,以和平、民主、团结、统一为基础,并在蒋主席领导之下,长期合作,坚决避免内战,建设独立、自由和富强的新中国,澈底实行三民主义。双方又同认蒋主席所倡导之政治民主化、军队国家化、及党派平等合法,为达到和平建国必由之途径。

二、关于政治民主化问题,一致认为应迅速结束训政,实施宪政,并应先采必要步骤,由国民政府召开政治协商会议,邀集各党派代表及社会贤达协商国是,讨论和平建国方案及召开国民大会各项问题。现双方正与各方洽商政治协商会议名额、组织及其职权等项问题,双方同意一俟洽商完毕,政治协商会议即应迅速召开。

三、关于国民大会问题,中共方面提出:重选国民大会代表,延缓国民大会召开日期及修改国民大会组织法、选举法和五五宪法草案等三项主张。政府方面表示:国民大会已选出之代表,应为有效,其名额可使之合理的增加和合法的解决,五五宪法草案原曾发动各界研讨,贡献修改意见。因此,双方未能成立协议。但中共方面声明:中共不愿见因此项问题之争论而破裂团结。同时双方均同意将此问题提交政治协商会议解决。

四、关于人民自由问题,一致认为政府应保证人民享受一切民主国家人民在平时应享受身体、信仰、言论、出版、集会、结社之自由,现行法令当依此原则,分别于以废止或修正。

五、关于党派合法问题,中共方面提出:政府应承认国民党、共产党及一切党派的平等合法地位。政府方面表示:各党派在法律之前平等,本为宪政常轨,今可即行承认。

六、关于特务机关问题,双方同意政府应严禁司法和警察以外机关有拘捕、审讯和处罚人民之权。

七、关于释放政治犯问题,中共方面提出:除汉奸以外之政治犯,政府应一律释放。政府方面表示:政府准备自动办理,中共可将应释放之人提出名单。

八、关于地方自治问题,双方同意各地应积极推行地方自治,实行由下而上的普选,惟政府希望不以此影响国民大会之召开。

九、关于军队国家化问题,中共方面提出:政府应公平合理地整编全国军队,确定分期实施计划,并重划军区,确定征补制度,以谋军令之统一。在此计划下,中共愿将其所领导的抗日军队由现有数目缩编至二十四个师至少二十个师的数目,并表示可迅速将其所领导而散布在广东、浙江、苏南、皖南、皖中、湖南、湖北、河南(豫北不在内)八个地区的抗日军队着手复员,并从上述地区逐步撤退应整编的部队至防海路以北及苏北、皖北的解放区集中。政府方面表示,全国整编计划正在进行,此次提出商谈之各项问题,果能全盘解决,则中共所领导的抗日军队缩编至二十个师的数目,可以考虑。关于驻地问题,可由中共方面提出方案,讨论决定。中共方面提出:中共及地方军事人员应参加军事委员会及其各部的工作,政府应保障人事制度,任用原部队人员为整编后的部队的各级官佐,编余官佐,应实行分区训练,设立公平合理的补给制度,并确定政治教育计划。政府方面表示:所提各项,均无问题,亦愿商谈详细办法。中共方面提出:解放区民兵应一律编为地方自卫队。政府方面表示:只能视地方情势有必要与可能时,酌量编置。为具体计划本项所述各问题起见,双方同意组织三人小组(军令部、军政部及第十八集团军各派一人)进行之。

十、关于解放区地方政府问题,中共方面提出:政府应承认解放区各级民选政府的合法地位。政府方面表示:解放区名词在日本投降以后,应成为过去,全国政令必须统一。中共方面开始提出的方案为:依照现有十八个解放区的情形,重划省区和行政区,并即以原由民选之各级地方政府名单呈请中央加委,以谋政令之统一。政府方面表示:依据蒋主席曾向毛先生表示:在全国军令政令统一以后,中央可考虑中共所荐之行政人选。收复区内原任抗战行政工作人员,政府可依其工作能力与成绩,酌量使其继续为地方服务,不因党派关系而有所差别。于是中共方面提出第二种解决方案,请中央于陕甘宁边区及热河、察哈尔、河北、山东、山西五省委任中共推选之人员为省府主席及委员,于绥远、河南、江苏、安徽、湖北、广东六省委任中共推选之人为省府副主席及委员(因以上十一省或有广大解放区或有部分解放区),于北平、天津、青岛、上海四特别市委任中共推选之人为副市长,于东北各省容许中共推选之人参加行政。此事讨论多次,后中共方面对上述提议,有所修改,请委任省府主席及委员者改为陕甘宁边区及热、察、冀、鲁四省,请委省府副主席及委员者,改为晋、绥两省,请委副市长者改为平、津、青岛三特别市。政府方面对此表示:中共对于其抗战卓著勤劳,且在政治上具有能力之同志,可提请政府决定任用,倘要由中共推荐某某省主席及委员,某某省副主席等,则即非真诚做到军令政令之统一。于是中共方面表示可放弃第二种主张,改提第三种解决方案:由解放区各级民选政府重新举行人民普选,在政治协商会议派员监督之下,欢迎各党派、各界人士还乡参加选举。凡一县有过半数区乡已实行民选者,即举行县级民选。凡一省或一行政区有过半数县已实行民选者,即举行省级或行政区民选。选出之省区县级政府,一律呈请中央加委,以谋政令之统一。政府方面表示:此种省区加委方式,乃非谋政令之统一,惟县级民选可以考虑,省级民选须持宪法颁布,省的地位确定以后方可实施。目前只能由中央任命之省政府前往各地接管行政,俾即恢复常态。至此,中共方面提出第四种解决方案:各解放区暂维持现状不变,留待宪法规定民选省级政府实施后再行解决,而目前则规定临时办法,以保证和平秩序之恢复。同时,中共方面认为:可将此项问题,提交政治协商会议解决。政府方面则以政令统一必须提前实现,此项问题久悬不决,虑为和平建设之障碍,仍亟盼能商得具体解决方案。中共方面亦同意继续商谈。

十一、关于奸伪问题,中共方面提出:严惩汉奸,解散伪军。政府方面表示:此在原则上自无问题,谁惩治汉奸要依法律行之,解散伪军亦须妥慎办理,以免影响当地安宁。

十二、关于受降问题,中共方面提出:重划受降地区,多加受降工作。政府方面表示:参加受降工作,在已接受中央命令之后,自可考虑。

中华民国三十四年国庆纪念日于重庆

王世杰 张群 张治中

邵力子 周恩来 王若飞

根据1945年10月12日《解放日报》刊印

"I totally agree, but it should also be noted that it was in the spirit of 'pragmatism' that Nixon made his famous visit to China, starting the sequence of events which ended with the re-establishing of relations between the US and China (although it should be noted that China enjoyed relations with Britain and France for a number of years before that). Do you think that opening to the west on this 'pragmatic' basis has helped to promote democracy in China or discourage it?"

Nixon, fixed sino-america relationship, not to promote democracy, not at all. I read an article about U.S, India, Pakistan and Soviet the other day: Nixon needed China's 'help' in the India-Pakistan conflict (Soviet was involved). But I didn't save the link. Maybe you can search it.

I agree to your point on the 'open'. Actually, it is 'open' that promotes democracy. Open mind, open policy, etc.

The democratic countries often use embargo as tool to force democracy in some countries, and 'close' the door to democracy.

But democracy is not outcome of 'pragmatism', not. Only when 'pragmatism' leads to 'open'.

Hi,

Does anyone know where I can get 炎黄春秋 in Shanghai?

Thanks,

Anton

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